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INTRODUCTION
The Trump presidency has provided urban politicians a chance at
national prominence, as urban leaders across the country assert their
ability to implement progressive policies at the local level. For
example, after President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
Climate Accords, mayors of major U.S. cities vowed to meet the Paris
goals on their own,1 and the Climate Mayors, a group of municipal

*

Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State
University. I am honored to be among those participating in this symposium issue of
the Fordham Urban Law Journal exploring a reimagined localism. It is an apt time to
reconsider localism. I wish to thank Frank Kearl for organizing the symposium and
inviting me to participate. I would also like to thank Frank, Traci Krasne, Miyoshie
Lamothe-Aime for their thoughtful editorial suggestions, and Ruth Tziporah ScharffBendor, who came into being only slightly faster than this Essay got written.
1. See Press Release, Martin J. Walsh, Mayor of the City of Boston, Statement
from Mayor Walsh on Paris Climate Agreement (June 1, 2017),
https://www.boston.gov/news/statement-mayor-walsh-paris-climate-agreement
[https://perma.cc/3RBB-3LZ5]; Press Release, Rahm Emanuel, Mayor of the City of
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leaders pledging to take action on climate change, has swelled to 407
mayors, representing cities both large and small.2 Similarly, urban
leaders have opposed President Trump’s efforts to deport
undocumented immigrants. Boston mayor Martin Walsh declared
that, “[i]f necessary, we will use City Hall itself to shelter and protect
anyone who’s targeted unjustly,” and told reporters that those who
fear deportation “can use my office, they can use any office in this
building.”3 Several jurisdictions, including San Francisco and Santa
Clara, filed a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s Executive Order
cutting federal funding for “sanctuary cities” — municipalities that
attempt to limit federal immigration enforcement in their
jurisdictions.4
Urban politicians have also sought to fill the void in progressive
leadership at the state level. For example, mayors and local
governments have tried to push state legislatures to allow more local
regulation of guns.5 They have also advocated for, and implemented,

Chi., Statement from Mayor Emanuel on Paris Agreement (May 31, 2017),
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2017/m
ay/ParisAgreement.html [https://perma.cc/U8R9-MT9D]; Press Release, Megan
Barry, Mayor of the City of Nashville, Mayor Barry Statement on Paris Agreement
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nashville.gov/News-Media/News-Article/ID/6458/MayorBarry-Statement-on-Paris-Agreement.aspx [https://perma.cc/YQ4X-GWBG]; Press
Release, Bill De Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Statement from Mayor de Blasio on US
Withdrawal
from
Paris
Climate
Agreement
(June
1,
2017),
https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/381-17/statement-mayor-de-blasio-uswithdrawal-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/L4MM-UQTF]; Eli Watkins,
Pittsburgh Mayor Hits Back After Trump Invokes City in Climate Speech , CNN
POLITICS
(June
2,
2017,
1:09
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/01/politics/pittsburgh-mayor-donald-trump/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6JYU-HZ9L]; Press Release, Eric Garcetti, Mayor of the City of
L.A., Mayor Garcetti Leads ‘Climate Mayors’ to Oppose U.S. Withdrawal from Paris
Agreement
(June
1,
2017),
https://www.lamayor.org/mayor-garcetti-leads%
E2%
80%
98climate-mayors%
E2%
80%
99-oppose-us-withdrawal-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/BLJ2-38R8].
2. Members, CLIMATE MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/about/members/
[https://perma.cc/FK8R-MMYE].
3. Steve LeBlanc, Boston Mayor Vows to Use City Hall to Shelter Immigrants,
WASH.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jan/25/boston-mayor-vows-to-use-cityhall-to-shelter-immi/ [https://perma.cc/3NW5-YXS7].
4. See Camila Domonoske, Judge Blocks Trump Administration from Punishing
‘Sanctuary Cities,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 21, 2017, 12:48 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/21/565678707/enter-title
[https://perma.cc/G2MY-5UXJ].
5. See Andrew Gillum et al., Opinion, Mayor Wants to Pass Gun Safety Laws,
but the NRA and Our State Legislatures Won’t Let Us, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2018,
7:52 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/03/23/mayors-want-guncontrol-but-blocked-nra-preemption-laws-column/450893002/
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policies on a range of issues of national concern, including efforts to
curb obesity and related health issues,6 protect the environment,7
promote participatory democracy,8 improve working conditions for
low-income workers,9 and safeguard civil rights protections.10
[https://perma.cc/6FN6-TLJY]; Sarah Holder, The Escalating City-State Battle over
Guns, CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/who-has-theright-to-govern-your-guns/558119/ [https://perma.cc/75A7-UHXU].
6. See Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of
Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1237–41 (2014).
7. See Nadia S. Adawi, State Preemption of Local Control over Intensive
Livestock Operations, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10506, 10511 (2014).
There is particularly voluminous literature on local fracking bans. See, e.g., Colin C.
Deihl et al., Tug of War over Colorado’s Energy Future: State Preemption of Local
Fracking Bans, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10524, 10525 (2014); Stephen
Elkind, Preemption and Home-Rule: The Power of Local Governments to Ban or
Burden Hydraulic Fracturing, 11 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 415, 415–16 (2016);
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Hydrofracking and Home Rule: Defending and Defining an
Anti-Preemption Canon of Statutory Construction in New York , 77 ALB. L. REV.
647, 648 (2014); Jamal Knight & Bethany Gullman, The Power of State Interest:
Preemption of Local Fracking Ordinances in Home-Rule Cities, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
297, 297 (2015); Alex Ritchie, Fracking in Louisiana: The Missing Process/Land Use
Distinction in State Preemption and Opportunities for Local Participation , 76 LA. L.
REV. 809, 811–13 (2016); Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental
Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2015); David B. Spence, The Political
Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 351–52 (2014); Rachel A. Kitze,
Note, Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the Power of Local Governments over
Hydraulic Fracturing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 385, 386–87 (2013); Adam J. Loos, Comment,
When Prohibition Is Not Regulation: Analyzing the Court’s Decision in Wallach v.
Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014), 40 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 121–22 (2015);
Bryan M. Weynand, Comment, Placing the Seal on a Fractured Debate: How North

Carolina Clarified Its Law of Hydraulic Fracturing and Can Strike the Right Balance
with Preemption of Local Regulation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 596, 597 (2015).
8. See Brian Wampler, Power to Participate: Engaging Citizens in Urban
Planning, BLUE REVIEW (Sept. 18, 2013), https://thebluereview.org/participatory-

democracy-planning/ [https://perma.cc/9JG7-7E7H] (discussing local government
agency in Idaho seeking to promote citizen involvement in public decision-making);
Hollie Russon Gilman, The Moment for Participatory Democracy, Three Civic

Engagement Models that Can Help Bring the Voices of Everyday Citizens into
Public
Life,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Apr.
19,
2017),

https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_moment_for_participatory_democracy#
[https://perma.cc/V873-3W93] (mentioning ways local governments are encouraging
public participation).
9. E.g., Marni von Wilpert, City Governments Are Raising Standards for
Working People–and State Legislatures Are Lowering Them Back Down, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 26, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/city-governments-areraising-standards-for-working-people-and-state-legislators-are-lowering-them-backdown/ [https://perma.cc/5S2T-SAZX] (discussing ways local governments are
responding to state preemption of local wage and labor standards ordinances).
10. E.g., Simon Davis-Cohen, The States Are Attacking Local Civil Rights Law,
PROGRESSIVE (May 31, 2018), http://progressive.org/dispatches/the-states-areattacking-local-civil-rights-law/ [https://perma.cc/4PUX-ZSRF] (noting that local
ordinances offer protections to LGBTQ persons in absence of state-wide
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Reimagined localism reflects excitement about cities as
laboratories for policy experimentation. These efforts paint the
picture of increasingly active and powerful local governments and
local officials. The picture, however, is more complicated than these
anecdotes suggest.
As academic and political advocates of local power observe, efforts
to implement progressive policies at the local level have drawn the ire
of state legislatures and governors.11 State legislators are both
proposing and passing more laws preempting local authority.12
Traditionally, state preemption laws simply took away local
regulatory authority, but these new “hyper preemption” efforts go
beyond that.13 These new preemption laws increasingly seek to
punish local governments and local officials for passing and enforcing
regulations that exceed local authority and thereby directly threaten
local regulatory innovation.14 Traditional and hyper preemption
statutes, however, are not the only constraints on local autonomy.
Fiscal constraints also significantly limit local autonomy.15 State
law restricts local governments’ abilities both to tax and to borrow.16
Local governments may also face practical limits on their ability to
raise taxes without inviting an exodus of local businesses or residents.
For example, even jurisdictions with authority to set their own sales

protections); see also Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case
of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 148–50 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 1995, 1997–2002 (2018); James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Public Health
“Preemption Plus,” 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 156 (2017); Erin A. Scharff, Hyper
Preemption: A Reordering of the State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469,
1471–72 (2018) [hereinafter Hyper Preemption]; Richard C. Schragger, The Attack
on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163 (2018); see also Emily Badger, Blue Cities
Want to Make Their Own Rules. Red States Won’t Let Them. , N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/upshot/blue-cities-want-to-make-theirown-rules-red-states-wont-let-them.html
[https://perma.cc/XZ98-LEUQ];
see
generally Richard Briffault et al., The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The
Assault on Progressive Cities and How Cities Can Respond, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR
L. &
POL’Y ISSUE BRIEF (Sept.
2017),
https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/ACS_Issue_Brief_-_Preemption_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BFN-FUST] [hereinafter Troubling Turn].
12. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1471–72; see also supra notes 10 and
11.
13. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1471–72.
14. Id. at 1473.
15. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 212 (2008).
16. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK
476–77 tbl. A1 (2001); see generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV.
U.L. REV. 1241 (2009) [hereinafter Fiscal Home Rule].
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tax rates face tax competition from neighboring jurisdictions, which
limits the amount of revenue that could be collected by raising sales
tax rates.17 As a result, local governments often lack the independent
resources necessary to pursue policies favored by local residents.
Hyper preemption efforts depend on fiscal constraints because the
threat of fiscal sanctions dissuades localities from challenging state
preemption legislation. Localities fear these sanctions because they
would struggle to compensate for the considerable revenue loss that
would result from the imposition of such sanctions.18 But the
relationship between fiscal constraints and hyper preemption runs
even deeper.19 Limits on local fiscal autonomy likely influence local
interest in regulatory policy in the first place. For example, fiscal
constraints may prevent local officials from expanding progressive
spending programs, while in actuality, progressive regulatory policies
may impose few direct costs on local government and may be a
cheaper way of implementing a progressive policy agenda.
Fiscal constraints are likely to increase, at least in the near future.
First, cities will face increasing pressure to spend more on public
pensions and infrastructure maintenance to make up for earlier
underinvestment in these areas. Second, cities will face pressure from
changes in federal budget policies.
This Essay explores the relationship between local fiscal and
regulatory authority in light of the changing landscape of regulatory
preemption. Part I provides further background on local fiscal
authority and the ways in which hyper preemption depends on limited
local authority. Part II explores the ways in which limited fiscal
authority may contribute to a renewed interest in local regulatory
authority, and discusses the reasons these constraints are likely to

17. Erin A. Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 325–26 (2016) [hereinafter
Powerful Cities].
18. E.g., Complaint at 5, City of Tucson v. Arizona, C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct.

Dec. 12, 2016) (noting that state-share revenue is about 23.5%of Tucson’s general
revenue fund); Ari Shapiro & Jude Joffe Block, Arizona Law Targets City
Governments by Cutting off Funds, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:36 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/12/19/506199963/arizona-law-targets-city-governments-bycutting-off-funds [https://perma.cc/B5LN-TPYV] (noting that Tucson faced losing all
of its shared revenue from the State if found non-compliant with Arizona state law);
Henry Graber, Phoenix Has Beef with Arizona, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/09/phoenix_mayor_greg_stant
on_is_fed_up_with_arizona_pre_empting_his_city_s.html
[https://perma.cc/9A46LGV3] (reporting Phoenix mayor’s frustration with Arizona’s preemption statute
assertion, contending it has a chilling effect on liberal cities).
19. See Troubling Turn, supra note 11.
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increase. Part III argues that these increasing fiscal constraints both
limit local governments’ ability to adequately address matters of
traditional local concern and hinder local governments’ ability to
respond to leadership failures at the state and national levels.
I.

LOCAL AUTONOMY AND LOCAL DEPENDENCE

All states grant some authority to local governments. Most states
provide for some version of home rule, at least for larger
jurisdictions.20 Home rule provides local governments with authority
to act without prior state approval.21 Moreover, even in traditional
Dillon’s Rule states, where local governments may exercise only
those powers expressly granted by state law, municipalities have some
implied authority to act in ways necessary to carry out those
delegated powers.22 Nevertheless, local governments are creatures of
state law, and their legal authority to regulate, to tax, and even to
exist, depends upon state law. Political and practical constraints limit
this authority even further.
This Part first provides background on the fiscal constraints that
local governments face. It then discusses in more detail the ways in
which these constraints interact with emerging state efforts to restrict
local regulatory authority.
A. Local Fiscal Constraints
Local fiscal autonomy is limited both by state law restrictions on
local revenue authority and by practical constraints on the ability to
exercise this authority. Any discussion about local fiscal autonomy
must acknowledge the significant role the state plays in funding local
governments.
Cities receive funding through state aid and federal grant
programs.23 Data from 2010 suggests that, on average, state aid
20. See generally KRANE ET AL., supra note 16 (providing descriptions of home
rule authority (or lack thereof) in all fifty states).
21. See Fiscal Home Rule, supra note 16.
22. See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 963 (1991)
(“As formulated by its author — judge and treatise writer John F. Dillon — the
doctrine limits localities to exercise of those powers expressly delegated to them by
the state legislature or necessary to implement or necessarily implied from express
legislative grants.”).
23. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
(2013),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43967_FederalGrants.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GJ5-E9A3] (describing federal grants to local governments); Erica
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constituted slightly less than one-third of local government
revenues.24 This average, however, masks important differences
between states and types of local governments.25 For example, the
same data also illustrates that local governments in Vermont received
about sixty percent of their revenue from the state, while Nebraska
only provided about eighteen percent of local government revenue.26
Additionally, municipalities and townships are generally less reliant
on state aid than local school districts.27 Despite these variations,
however, state grants provide an important source of local
government funding for almost all jurisdictions.
States vary in the ways they contribute state dollars to local
governments. Typically, states provide much of their funding through
general aid, which allocates a percentage of state revenue to local
government based on fixed distribution formulas.28 Distribution
formulas often consider factors like population size and local needs.29
The formulas may also reflect a desire to return revenues to the
jurisdiction where the tax dollars are earned, so a state may allocate
some portion of the state sales tax to the jurisdiction in which the sale
occurs.30 States also use other methods. Arizona, for example,
allocates its state shared revenue from the state sales tax using a
formula that weighs a jurisdiction’s property tax revenue.31
States also provide funding to local governments for specific
programs in addition to general funding. For example, Arizona
provides dedicated funding to county and municipal libraries,32 and
Arkansas’ Historic Preservation Program provides funding to restore

Michel, State Aid to Local Governments, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-aid-to-local-government-update.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3ZDR-6ALZ].
24. Michel, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
A PUNISHING DECADE FOR SCHOOL FUNDING
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/a-punishing-decade-for-schoolfunding [https://perma.cc/8FWZ-5D9Z] (highlighting K-12 schools’ dependence on
state funding and noting that, on average, school districts receive about forty-seven
percent of their funding from the state).
28. See Michel, supra note 23.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5029 (2018).
32. See, e.g., State Grants-In-Aid (SGIA), ARIZ. ST. LIBR., ARCHIVES & PUB.
REC., https://azlibrary.gov/libdev/funding/sgi [https://perma.cc/4J7H-48SE].
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historic county courthouses.33 In Indiana, local governments can
apply for state aid to fund efforts to reduce water pollution.34 Ohio’s
Attorney General’s Office provides grants to local law enforcement
to assist in combating the state’s opioid epidemic.35
State influence on municipal budgets is not limited to direct
support. States exercise significant influence over local governments’
ability to raise revenue via taxes and their ability to borrow.36 As a
result, local governments often lack meaningful fiscal autonomy.
Generally, state law restricts municipal authority over fiscal affairs
more than it does in other policy areas.37 One leading survey of
municipal home rule found that only twelve states provide local
governments with fiscal control, but five of those states have only
limited fiscal authority.38 Beyond home rule, other constitutional
restrictions may also restrict local budget choices.39 Seattle’s head tax
on employees, for example, was developed in part because of the
city’s limited fiscal options.40 It has already aggressively raised
property taxes (and additional increases would likely exacerbate the

33. AHPP Accepting Applications for Courthouse, Restoration Grants, ARK.
HIST.
PRESERVATION
PROGRAM
(Nov.
17,
2017),
http://www.arkansaspreservation.com/blog/ahpp-accepting-applications-forcourthouse-restoration-grants [https://perma.cc/DC3X-L6M5].
34. See
Funding,
IND.
DEP’T
OF
ENVTL.
MGMT.
(2018),
https://www.in.gov/idem/4103.htm [https://perma.cc/6KRX-X7B6].
35. Press Release, Mike DeWine, Ohio Att’y Gen., Three Million in Grants for
DART and QRT Teams Awarded to Address Opioid Epidemic (Sept. 6, 2017),
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/September-2017/ThreeMillion-in-Grants-for-DART-and-QRT-Teams-Awa
[https://perma.cc/C9KQZV9Q].
36. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 915–16 (2003) (discussing
state constitutional limits on municipal borrowing authority); see, e.g., Liz GreenTaylor, Local Debt Limitations Primer – Washington State Department of
Commerce,
WASH.
STATE
DEP’T
OF
COMMERCE
(May
2014),
https://www.commerce.wa.gov/about-us/research-services/bond-usersclearinghouse/local-debt-limitations-primer/
[https://perma.cc/EKR2-DTB2]
(discussing Washington State government’s process to determine how much more
debt a local government can assume).
37. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 16, at 474, 476–77 (categorizing the powers that
states grant under home rule).
38. See id. at 471, 476–77 (listing extent of fiscal home rule authority in each
state).
39. See Fiscal Home Rule, supra note 16, at 1246.
40. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Richard C. Auxier, Seattle’s Head Tax Is a Fine
Idea, Given the Circumstances, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 11, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/seattles-head-tax-fine-idea-givencircumstances [https://perma.cc/8RHU-428Q] (stating that the head tax required
companies to pay twenty-six cents for every hour an employee worked).
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city’s affordable housing problem), and the city lacks authority to
impose an income tax under state law.41
Finally, horizontal and vertical tax competition imposes practical
limits on a local government’s ability to raise tax revenue by
increasing tax rates. Horizontal tax competition is tax competition
between neighboring jurisdictions.42 For example, sales tax rates in
neighboring suburbs will likely be relatively similar because greater
differentials in tax rates would push shoppers to a neighboring
jurisdiction.43 In contrast, vertical tax competition is tax competition
between overlapping levels of government.44 For example, a state’s
sales tax rate limits a locality’s ability to generate sales tax revenue
from a tax increase. The state sales tax pushes up the overall level of
sales tax, and thus affects consumer demand for products.
B. States Can Limit Local Regulatory Authority Too
While states generally provide local governments with some
authority to regulate as a way to protect the public welfare, the state’s
ability to preempt local ordinances often limits this authority. This
section discusses the state’s preemption authority, including reasons
why states may want to limit local authority. It also describes the
increasingly aggressive use of this preemption authority and
concludes by discussing possible limits.
While local governments traditionally have had greater regulatory
than fiscal authority, the state’s preemption powers have always
limited regulatory authority.45
Even in jurisdictions granting
relatively broad authority to local governments, states retain the right
to preempt local regulations on matters of statewide concern.46 Local
regulation of activity often has spillover effects, so the state will have
a persuasive argument that it is regulating on a matter of statewide
concern.
Consider a law requiring a municipal living wage higher than
minimum wage imposed by federal and state laws. While such a law
could only apply to workers employed within the jurisdiction, the
State can reasonably argue that wages are a matter of statewide
41. Id.
42. See Timothy J. Goodspeed, Tax Competition, Benefit Taxes, and Fiscal
Federalism, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 579, 581 (1998).
43. Powerful Cities, supra note 17, at 321–22.
44. See Goodspeed, supra note 42, at 581.
45. Powerful Cities, supra note 17, at 339–40.
46. See generally Paul A. Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113
(2007).
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concern. First, the state can assert it has an interest in employment
regulation uniformity, so that companies operating in multiple
jurisdictions do not have to master multiple legal regimes, thereby
increasing compliance costs, and thus, the cost of doing business in
the state. Second, the state can argue that the wage rate in one
jurisdiction will affect the wages employers must offer in neighboring
jurisdictions as well; thus, it has an interest in limiting these spillover
effects to ensure that high wages do not increase unemployment or
make the state unattractive to business. State courts have usually
been deferential to such arguments.47
In recent years, state preemption efforts have become even more
aggressive. In the past, states found it sufficient to deny local
governments the authority to act, rendering preempted local
ordinances ultra vires.48 Now, state legislatures are increasingly
debating (and passing) bills that seek not only to limit local authority,
but also to sanction local governments and local public officials that
run afoul of state preemption laws.49 Most of these sanctions are
financial, with state law imposing fines on both governments that
adopt ordinances preempted by state law and on local officials who
enforce these ordinances.50 However, some states have also sought
additional authority, such as to remove local elected officials.51
Hyper preemption legislation often provides significant fiscal
sanctions for local governments found to be in violation of state law.
For example, Arizona enacted a law in 2015 that imposed significant
fiscal sanctions on localities that adopt ordinances that state
authorities find violate state law.52 If Arizona’s attorney general
concludes that an ordinance violates state law, the law provides a
short period for the jurisdiction to repeal the ordinance.53 If the local
government refuses to repeal the ordinance, the law directs the
attorney general to instruct the state treasurer to withhold state
shared revenue from the jurisdiction until the ordinance is repealed.54
For Tucson, the sanction threatened about a quarter of its general

47. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1990).
48. See Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1476–79.
49. Id. at 1495.
50. Id.
51. FLA. STAT. § 790.33 (2018).
52. See S. 1487, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41194.01 (2016).
53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2016).
54. Id.
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revenue fund.55 Tucson tried to challenge the constitutionality of
Arizona’s preemption statute regarding a dispute over Tucson’s
policy of destroying certain guns seized by police officers.56 State law
required such guns to be sold to the public.57 In adjudicating the
challenge, the Arizona Supreme Court found Tucson’s gun ordinance
preempted, and it rejected many of the city’s constitutional
arguments.58
Other preemption bills impose fiscal sanctions only for specific
conflicts with state law. For example, legislation seeking to restrict
the local adoption of a “sanctuary city” policy often provides fiscal
sanctions for adopting such policies. Arizona’s S.B. 1070, for
example, established civil fines of up to $5,000 for each day that a
locality was in violation of a state law requiring local law
enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officers and
enforce immigration law. 59 Michigan’s proposed legislation would
have prohibited local governments from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing]
any law . . . that limits or prohibits a[n] . . . officer . . . from
communicating or cooperating with appropriate federal officials
concerning the immigration status of an individual in this state.” 60
The proposed Michigan law would have required the state treasurer
to withhold state revenue sharing funds from local governments
that fail to comply with this order. 61 Similar Florida legislation
would impose a fine of at least $1,000 a day for sanctuary policies
adopted contrary to state law and would prohibit a locality from
receiving any state grant funding for a five-year period beginning
on the date the locality is adjudicated to be in violation of the
statute.62
There may be both legal and political limits to the state’s
preemption authority. As several local government scholars note,
some state constitutions limit state authority over certain aspects of
local government regulation.63 Additionally, various state political

55. Complaint at 5, City of Tucson v. Arizona, No. C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
Dec. 12, 2016).
56. Id. at 2, 14.
57. Id. at 14.
58. State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, 399 P.3d 663, 669 (Ariz. 2017).
59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010).
60. H.R. 4105, 99th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2017).
61. Id. (stating that the treasurer “shall withhold the total annual payment
amount that the local unit of government receives under the Glenn Steil state
revenue sharing act of 1971 . . . ”).
62. S. 786, 119th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017).
63. See generally Troubling Turn, supra note 11.
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process rules, like single-subject requirements,64 may mean that
certain preemption bills run afoul of state constitutional rules.65
Further, current litigation challenges some state preemption efforts
under the federal constitution.66
Political constraints may also limit state preemption efforts.67 As
Professor Richard Schragger observes, business interests worked to
defeat bills copying North Carolina’s controversial law, H.B. 2—
which preempted local government anti-discrimination ordinances—
and North Carolina itself faced considerable economic pressure to
repeal its legislation.68 This type of political pressure may be limited.
In many cases, it is these same business interests pushing preemption
legislation.69
C.

Hyper Preemption’s Success Depends on Limited Local Fiscal
Authority

While scholars have observed this punitive turn in preemption
law,70 the connection between hyper preemption and limited fiscal
authority has not yet been a focus of this scholarship. Indeed, hyper
preemption efforts are intimately intertwined with limits on local
fiscal autonomy. The threat of sanctions limits local policy autonomy
precisely because local governments lack the fiscal capacity to bear
these sanctions. In this sense, hyper preemption leaves cities doubly
vulnerable: the costs of litigation to deter local governments from
acting, and the threat of sanctions, on top of those court costs, make
resistance potentially self-defeating.
It is possible that hyper preemption policies have not yet reached
the heart of state power over local finances. Current versions of these
bills threaten to remove state funding when a city violates a state law

64. Id. at 12–13. Single-subject requirements ensure that when the legislature
votes on a particular bill, that bill only addresses on particular policy issue. For
example, the same bill could not address both school funding and qualifications for
elected office in the state.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., El Cenizo v. Texas, 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018) (involving claim that Texas
preemption statute regarding immigration violated federal Constitution).
67. Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at 1518–20; Schragger, supra note 11, at
1226–30.
68. Schragger, supra note 11, at 1228–30.
69. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to
Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403 (2017).
70. See supra note 12.
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or creates fiscal sanctions (payable to the state) for such violations,71
but states could also condition funding on cities adhering to a list of
policies. At the federal level, restrictions to the congressional
spending power might limit such conditional funding, 72 but there is
no analog to this limit in most state constitutions.73
State governments can also threaten local government funding to
retaliate against local policies. Such retaliation takes several forms.
First, state governments could cut discretionary grants to local
governments. For example, the State of Tennessee recently withdrew
previously authorized financial support for the City of Memphis’s
bicentennial celebration.74 State legislators voting in favor of the
funding cut made it clear that they did so in response to Memphis’s
legal efforts to remove Confederate statues from city parks.75
Because state law prevented the city itself from removing the statues,
the city sold the statues and the land underneath to a not-for-profit,
which subsequently removed them.76 Legal theories challenging the
state’s actions are, at best, untested. The state’s discretionary
spending programs are precisely that, discretionary, and the
legislature has broad authority to redirect such program funding.
Second, state governments could reduce local fiscal authority more
generally. Such a move need not be retaliatory. In fact, state officials
that support the deregulatory agenda of hyper preemption are also
likely to support limited local taxing authority. Leaders in Texas’
Republican Party, including Governor Greg Abbot and Lieutenant
Governor Dan Patrick, have endorsed a plan to limit local property
tax growth by making it far easier for local voters to limit a locality’s
ability to raise revenue.77 While moderates defeated a similar plan in

71.
72.
73.
74.

See supra text accompanying notes 52–55.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
See, e.g., Hyper Preemption, supra note 11, at n.226.
Sheila Burke, Tennessee Lawmakers Punish Memphis for Removing Statues,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
NEWS
(Apr.
18,
2018),
https://apnews.com/17ec9774415240b0a7b1ec41d923eb3c
[https://perma.cc/GUB94WVZ].
75. Id.
76. Daniel Connolly & Vivian Wang, Confederate Statues in Memphis Are
Removed After City Council Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:43 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/statue-memphis-removed.html
[https://perma.cc/4MWU-W7B7].
77. Phil Brazan, Abbot, Patrick Throwing Weight Behind Property Tax Reform
in
GOP
Primary,
KXAN
(Feb.
12,
2018,
12:52
PM),
https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/abbott-patrick-throwing-weight-behindproperty-tax-reform-in-gop-primary_20180312075734707/1031501913
[https://perma.cc/EM2X-4CQY].
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Texas’s last legislative session,78 the leader of the moderate wing of
the Texas Republic Party, House Speaker Joe Straus, is not seeking
reelection.79 Local officials fear the proposal would make it much
harder for them to balance their budgets.80 While the Texas reform is
not explicitly tied to the state’s preemption agenda, it clearly targets
urban areas. Like hyper preemption legislation, these state fiscal
limits imply a distrust of local voters to decide for themselves how to
regulate local revenue. Texas is not the only state considering limiting
local property taxes; members of the Illinois legislature have
introduced a bill that would allow more local voters to weigh in on
property tax changes, creating an additional roadblock for city
officials seeking to raise property taxes.81
II. FISCAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CITY
Fiscal constraints also shape regulation. Regulatory ordinances are
often cheaper to implement than other progressive policies, which
require more direct government outlay. For example, consider the
policy choices facing an urban leader who wants to improve the lives
of working parents, especially the working poor. Providing those
parents with additional childcare assistance would require a direct
outlay of government revenue. On the other hand, there are few

78. Morgan Smith & Patrick Svitek, Texas Legislature Ends Special Session
Passing Property Tax Measure, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/15/texas-house-adjourns-sine-die
[https://perma.cc/DN8U-D2LC].
79. Matthew Watkins, Texas House Speaker Joe Straus Says He Will Not Seek
Re-Election,
TEX.
TRIB.
(Oct.
25,
2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/25/speaker-house-joe-straus-wont-seekreelection/ [https://perma.cc/SLL7-6PAH].
80. See generally Dagney Pruner, Dallas Mayor, First Responders Speak Against
Property Tax Bill at Heated Hearing, DALL. NEWS (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/texas-politics/2017/03/14/dallas-mayor-firstresponders-speak-property-tax-bill-heated-hearing [https://perma.cc/DPL6-XWPT];
Clay Falls, College Station Mayor Worried About Property Tax Changes, KBRXTV3 (July 18, 2017, 6:49 PM), http://www.kbtx.com/content/news/College-StationMayor-worried-about-property-tax-changes-during-special-session-435263343.html
[https://perma.cc/T3DL-F576]; Dave Montgomery, Local Leaders Decry Proposed
Property Tax Overhaul, STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:17 PM),
https://www.star-telegram.com/news/state/texas/article138537823.html
[https://perma.cc/H3HR-GUJL]; Wes Rapaport, Emergency Responders Announce
Opposition to Property Tax Bill, KXAN (Aug. 9, 2017, 2:48 P.M.),
https://www.kxan.com/news/emergency-responders-announce-opposition-toproperty-tax-bill/994662380 [https://perma.cc/6G28-5HWT].
81. Illinois Proposal Could Lead to More Property Tax Cuts, CBS CHI. (Apr. 23,
2018, 12:08 PM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2018/04/23/illinois-proposal-could-leadto-property-tax-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/3KAR-MVHS].
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direct costs to requiring local businesses to offer workers a
predictable schedule (so that childcare is easier to arrange) and paid
sick days (so that workers can afford to take time off to care for their
children).
This Part discusses factors that shape urban leaders’ interest in the
creative use of their regulatory authority, including the role that fiscal
constraints play. It then suggests that such constraints are likely to
remain and argues that these constraints are likely to increase in the
near term.
A. Limited Autonomy Influences the Local Regulatory Agenda
Local leaders have led the way on a variety of innovative
regulatory efforts in recent years.82 For example, local governments
spearheaded efforts to improve nutrition by limiting soda sizes, taxing
high sugar beverages, and adding calorie counts to restaurant
menus.83 Local governments have also sought to address the
environmental effects of fracking and factory farming84 and have
been policy leaders on important issues of work-life balance, like
predictable scheduling and paid sick days.85 There are many
explanations for this local regulatory innovation. This section
considers several that have been offered. It then argues that legal
constraints on local authority may nudge local leaders’ interest in
these policy areas. Other areas, like public pensions, that also require
attention from urban leaders are harder to address because of existing
constraints on local authority.
There are many reasons local leaders have been increasingly
willing to experiment with progressive regulatory policies. Local
leaders themselves often argue that they are stepping in because the

82. See supra notes 6–11; see generally Richard C. Schragger, The Political
Economy of City Power, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 129–30 (2017) (discussing

municipalities pushing for social welfare policies such as living wage movement and
sanctuary cities).
83. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 6, at 1239; see generally Beverly Bird, What Is the
Soda Tax and Which Cities Have One?, BALANCE (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.thebalance.com/soda-tax-and-which-cities-have-one-4151209
[https://perma.cc/TLC5-VU6K].
84. See supra note 8.
85. See von Wilpert, supra note 10, at nn.35, 39–40; see also Matt Crawley, Paid
Sick Leave Legislation Taking States, Municipalities by Storm, MULTISTATE INSIDER
(July 21, 2016), https://www.multistate.us/blog/insider/2016/07/paid-sick-leavelegislationtaking-states-municipalities-by-storm [https://perma.cc/928Q-JRG3].
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state and national leadership is not responsive to their constituents.86
According to Frank Sharry, a leading immigrant-rights advocate,
mayors committing to the preservation of sanctuary cities, for
example, “are not getting out in front of public opinion . . . but
reflecting it.”87 Or, as San Antonio mayor Ron Nirenberg put it,
“[t]he fundamental truth about the whole debate over local control is
that taking authority away from cities — preventing us from carrying
out the wishes of our constituents — is subverting the will of the
voter.”88 Of course, the preferences of voters statewide may differ
dramatically from the preferences of urban voters, and partisan
gerrymandering may make this disjuncture more pronounced in state
legislatures.89
Such political factors are not the only explanation for urban success
in implementing innovative regulatory policies. Paul Diller points to
the structure of local government to explain local innovations in
public health, noting that the progressive public health agenda faces
fewer “vetogates” at the local level than it would at state and federal
levels.90 As Diller observes, city councils are unicameral chambers,
and super-majority requirements are rare with respect to local
regulatory policy.91 At the same time, Diller notes that special
interest groups may have a harder time mobilizing opposition at the
local level, given the number of local governments, which may help
enact such policies.92
There are probably more factors at play here than merely those
already discussed. Beyond these progressive regulatory policies,
other local issues call out for innovative policy solutions. Looming
pension problems represent a challenge to local governments as much

86. Tim Dickinson, Meet the Leaders of the Trump Resistance, ROLLING STONE
(Jan. 13, 2017, 7:36 P.M.), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politicsfeatures/meet-the-leaders-of-the-trump-resistance-124691/ [https://perma.cc/5FW9C3H5] (noting that “America’s cities have emerged as centers of resistance to
Trump’s deportation plans” and “[t]he reality is that undocumented immigrants are
more popular in America’s cities than is the president”).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Andy Duehren & Brandon Formby, As Lawmakers Try to Curb Local Texas
Governments, Big-City Mayors Left Out of Meetings with Abbott, TEX. TRIB. (July
26,
2017),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/07/26/lawmakers-curb-localgovernments-abbott-ignores-big-city-mayors/ [https://perma.cc/R99F-NK6J].
89. Brentin Mock, Where Gerrymandering Is Containing City Power, CITYLAB
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/01/how-gerrymandering-iscontaining-city-power/512621/ [https://perma.cc/UE6V-45CF].
90. Diller, supra note 6, at 1266–67.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1267–69.
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as state governments, and in many cases, state law restricts the ability
of local governments to improve the situation.93 In addition, cities,
especially older cities, have consistently underinvested in
infrastructure maintenance and improvement.94
Needed
improvements in municipal water systems have received even less
attention.95 And of course, in many jurisdictions, adaptations to
climate change are both needed and not fully accounted for in current
capital improvement plans.96
While these problems are well documented, they are not the kinds
of problems that local leaders want to discuss. On pensions, for
example, policymakers reveal a “remarkable degree of ignorance and
unwillingness to talk about the pension problem.”97 To illustrate this

93. Of course, there is significant heterogeneity among pension programs, and
there are also municipalities that do not face pension problems. See Joshua D. Rauh,

Hidden Debt, Hidden Deficits: 2017 Edition, How Pension Promises Are Consuming
State and Local Budgets, HOOVER INSTITUTION (June 14, 2018),

https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rauh_hiddendebt2017_final_
webreadypdf1.pdf [https://perma.cc/466X-PZH8]; Mary Williams Walsh, Dallas
Stares Down a Texas-Size Threat of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/business/dealbook/dallas-pension-debt-threatof-bankruptcy.html?_r=0. [https://perma.cc/E8NN-8RCR]; see also Alicia H.
Munnell, After Shared Sacrifice, Dallas Police and Fire Pension Problems
Addressed,
MARKETWATCH
(Aug.
8,
2017,
11:04
AM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/after-shared-sacrifice-dallas-police-and-firepension-problems-addressed-2017-08-07 [https://perma.cc/384A-MY95].
94. See generally James Surowiecki, System Overload, NEW YORKER (Apr. 19,
2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/inside-americasinfrastructure-problem [https://perma.cc/SAF5-R4NH]; Mary Beth Graebert et al.,

Integrated Asset Management: Dealing with Neglected Infrastructure and Vacant
Property in Legacy Cities, INFORMING THE DEBATE, MICH. APPLIED PUB. POL’Y

BRIEF
(2015),
http://ippsr.msu.edu/sites/default/files/MAPPR/Integrated%
20Asset%
20Management%
20
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M3W-GYRV].
95. See Lead Poisoning in Michigan Highlights Aging Water Systems Nationwide,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Jan.
2,
2016,
7:54
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/02/461735226/lead-poisoning-in-michigan-highlightsweakened-water-systems-nationwide
[https://perma.cc/7XHY-9FD2];
2017
Infrastructure Report Card, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS (June 14, 2018),
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/DrinkingWater-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TY5-WUEH].
96. See Allison Chatrchyan, Addressing Climate Change at the Municipal Level,
CORNELL
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(June
14,
2018),
http://climatechange.cornell.edu/addressing-climate-change-at-the-municipal-level/
[https://perma.cc/F4K9-UNZ8]; see generally Planning for Climate Change
Adaption , U.S. ENVTL. PROT, AGENCY (June 14, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/arcx/planning-climate-change-adaptation [https://perma.cc/D3DX-TSE5].
97. Patrick McGuinn, Pension Politics: Public Employee Retirement System
Reform in Four States, BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y AT BROOKINGS (Feb. 2014),

2018]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1287

problem, consider the current, non-partisan Phoenix mayoral race.
The non-profit group Truth-in-Accounting gave Phoenix a D grade
when reviewing its financial health, largely because of the city’s
pension problems.98
Local leaders may be primed to focus on new regulatory areas in
part because their ability to address these bread-and-butter issues of
local governance is more limited by state law. For example, most
states have constitutional provisions that protect pension benefits at
both the state and local levels.99 Such provisions make it much harder
for local officials to pass meaningful pension reform. Similarly,
placing limits on local fiscal autonomy significantly restricts a local
government’s ability to invest in infrastructure, as it consequently
limits their ability to raise revenue. As local governments attempt to
come into compliance with Clean Water Act requirements for storm
water drainage, they have needed to find new sources of income.100
In this way, hyper preemption legislation may emerge in response
to an urban regulatory agenda that has already been shaped by the
constraints of traditional state preemption. Prior limits on local
autonomy are now developing the policies that cities try to enact and
may be pushing cities toward regulatory innovations that lead to the
new preemption.
To be clear, these state-law imposed limits on fiscal authority affect
local governments in both red and blue states. New York City’s
struggles to reform public pensions in the wake of state interference
are at least as difficult as anything encountered in a more traditionally

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PensionPolitics_FINAL_225.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G4S-RNS6].
98. See Jessica Boehm, Phoenix, Mesa Earn ‘D’ Grades in Financial-Health
Review Due to Pension Debt, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:01 PM),
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2018/01/24/phoenix-mesa-tucsonbad-grades-financial-health-pension-crisis-truth-accounting/1054700001/
[https://perma.cc/8YAD-3WHR].
99. Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State
and Local Pensions, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT B.C. (Aug. 2012),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/slp_25.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD3NSXYX].
100. Theodore Scott, Stormwater Utilities Offer Sustainable Funding Mechanism
for
MS4
Programs,
WATERWORLD
(Aug.
2,
2013),
https://www.waterworld.com/articles/print/volume-29/issue-8/urban-watermanagement/stormwater-utilities.html [https://perma.cc/Y3KS-ZVCJ]; Joseph Kane
& Ranjitha Shivaram, As Flood Risks Intensify, Stormwater Utilities Offer a More
Resilient Solution, BROOKINGS (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2017/09/21/as-flood-risks-intensify-stormwater-utilities-offer-a-more-resilientsolution/ [https://perma.cc/7S44-GB99].
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red state.101 While California cities have significant independent
revenue authority, they are subject to significant restrictions on their
ability to use their property tax base because of Proposition 13.102
Further, many of the infrastructure problems facing urban areas are
regional in nature, and a legion of scholarship has documented the
difficulties localism poses for challenging regional issues.103
B.

The Half-Empty Glass: Increasing Restrictions on Fiscal Capital

For all the excitement about progressive regulatory policies
executed at the local level, fiscal constraints may make it much more
difficult for a reimagined localism to thrive. In particular, new
constraints on local finance are becoming an increasing challenge for
local governance.
First, the 2017 tax reform bill limited the state and local tax
deduction to $10,000.104 This limit places new pressure on local
governments to keep tax bills low, especially in jurisdictions where
many tax filers took the state and local tax (“SALT”) deduction.
Because higher income earners disproportionately benefitted from
the SALT deduction,105 the cap may also put pressures on them to
make more regressive changes to their tax structure. In New Jersey,
estimates suggest that thirty percent of taxpayers would reach the
$10,000 cap based on their property taxes alone, while twenty percent
of New Yorkers pay more than $10,000 in property taxes.106 Other
states, including many New England states, California, Illinois, and
Texas, also have significant populations whose property taxes exceed

101. See Mary Williams Walsh & Karl Russell, New York City Pensions Are Still
Crisis,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
20,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/business/dealbook/new-york-citypensions.html [https://perma.cc/35GN-U6XH].
102. ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE
LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 3 (1995).
103. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (providing a classic account of this criticism of
local power).
104. See 26 U.S.C. §164(b)(6) (2018).
105. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019 44–49 (1st Sess. 2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4857&chk=4857&no_html
=1 [https://perma.cc/R7HT-TNLN].
106. Michael Leachman, House Tax Bill’s Changes to State and Local Tax
Deductions Would Hurt States, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 2, 2017,
3:45 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/house-tax-bills-changes-to-state-and-local-taxdeductions-would-hurt-states [https://perma.cc/N7QR-VA3P].
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$10,000.107 Moreover, this is before taxpayers consider their state
(and local) income tax liability.
While much of the national media coverage has focused on the
effect of the capped SALT deduction on blue, coastal states, local
governments across the country have also expressed concern. For
example, in Ohio, the mayors of nineteen Cleveland suburbs signed a
letter opposing the limit.108 The mayors argued that repealing the
SALT deduction would “make it more burdensome and difficult for
residents and communities to maintain local taxes that are needed to
support police, fire, public works and public educational services for
children” and rejected the argument that lower federal tax rates
would counterbalance benefits to middle-class taxpayers.109 The U.S.
Conference of Mayors weighed in as well, arguing that changes to the
SALT deduction disproportionately affect our cities, leaving large
numbers of middle-class Americans paying more in taxes on dollars
they will never see in the first place.110 As Professor Matthew J.
Rossman observed, the SALT deduction reduced the burden of
higher taxes that middle- and upper-middle class taxpayers often face
when they choose to live in older cities, with greater legacy costs as a
result of aging infrastructure, among other issues.111 As a result, he
argues that “scaling back SALT in concert with doubling the

107. Id.
108. Earl M. Leiken, Opinion, Local Communities, Residents Will Suffer if GOP
Tax Plan Wipes Out State and Local Tax Deductions, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 29,
2017),
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/11/local_communities_residents_wi.
html [https://perma.cc/5HJN-SUPG] (reporting that the nineteen suburbs that signed
the letter opposing the limit were Shaker Heights, Pepper Pike, Bedford Heights,
Parma Heights, Garfield Heights, Parma, Olmsted Falls, Euclid, Brooklyn,
University Heights, Bedford, Orange Village, Fairview Park, Moreland Hills,
North Royalton, Cleveland Heights, Lakewood, Independence, and South
Euclid).
109. Id.
110. See Sara Durr, Mayors Urge Congress to Preserve State and Local Tax
Deduction,
U.S.
CONF.
OF
MAYORS
(Sept.
27,
2017),
https://www.usmayors.org/2017/09/27/mayors-urge-congress-to-preserve-state-andlocal-tax-deduction [https://perma.cc/TKA2-CUFY]. The Mayors’ statement was
issued in response to an earlier proposal to eliminate the SALT deduction entirely,
but their point about the SALT deduction mattering more in urban areas remains.
111. Matthew J. Rossman, Opinion, Cutback of State and Local Tax Deductions in
GOP Tax Bill Would Harm Ohio’s Legacy Cities, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Dec.
15,
2017)
https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2017/12/gop_tax_bills_state_and_local.h
tml [https://perma.cc/MP7M-KM9C].
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standard deduction may very well choke demand for housing in
legacy cities.”112
The deduction cap is an additional constraint on the ability of local
governments to increase revenue and thus pay for needed local
services. As a result, local governments may need to cut services. Of
course, as the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes, states
could raise other types of taxes, but “[t]hat would push more costs to
middle- and low-income people, and make state and local tax systems
even more regressive overall than they already are.”113
High-tax states are pursuing several policies to limit the effect on
the SALT deduction.114
The IRS recently issued guidelines
suggesting that they will seek to limit such gamesmanship.115 Thus,
the outcome of many of these legislative fixes is far from clear, and
local jurisdictions with high property taxes in lower tax states may
face pressure to cut taxes while lacking support for state-level reforms
that would relieve some of pressure of the SALT cap.
Second, the 2017 tax bill exacerbates the federal budget deficit and
portends another round of federal budget cuts. The budget cuts will
affect federal funding to both states and local governments.116 In

112. Id.
113. Michael Leachman & Iris J. Lav, Eliminating State and Local Tax Deduction
to Pay for Tax Cuts for Wealthy a Bad Deal for Most Americans , CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-andtax/eliminating-state-and-local-tax-deduction-to-pay-for-tax-cuts-for
[https://perma.cc/33V3-3RB7].
114. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman et al., Deduct This: How States Can Undo One of
the Most Potentially Destructive Elements of the Republican Tax Law , SLATE (Jan.
11, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/how-states-can-undoone-of-the-most-potentially-destructive-elements-of-the-new-tax-law.html
[https://perma.cc/7YPS-JTPV]; Joseph Bankman et al., State Responses to Federal
Tax Reform: Charitable Tax Credits, ST. TAX NOTES (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes/charitable-giving/state-responses-federal-taxreform-charitable-tax-credits/2018/04/30/27y9x [https://perma.cc/V8RX-SUHS]. New
York State is also challenging the SALT cap in federal court. Katie Lobosco, New
York and Three Other States Claim Trump Tax Law Is Unconstitutional , CNN (July
18, 2018, 9:29 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/17/politics/new-york-taxlawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/8BKM-FXNV].
115. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., GUIDANCE ON CERTAIN PAYMENTS MADE IN
EXCHANGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAX CREDITS: NOTICE 2018-54 (May 23, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-18-54.pdf [https://perma.cc/25UL-93HW].
116. For example, the 2018 Trump budget included significant cuts in federal aid at
both levels of government. Iris J. Lav & Michael Leachman, The Trump Budget’s
Massive Cuts to State and Local Services and Programs, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (June 13, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/thetrump-budgets-massive-cuts-to-state-and-local-services-and [https://perma.cc/6ZN8YMKD].
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other words, the belt-tightening at the federal and state level often
means that local governments are asked to do more with less money.
Third, additional state constitutional limits on local tax and
revenue growth may inhibit the fiscal capacity of cities. In Texas, the
governor endorsed a proposal to cap state property tax growth117 in a
way that almost suggests retribution for local government challenges
to S.B. 4, the state’s law that limits sanctuary city policies.118
Considering how state regulatory preemption has quickly become a
nationwide trend,119 it would not be surprising if more restrictions on
tax authority are in the works.120
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
What do fiscal constraints mean for local government power? It is,
of course, impossible to predict the future. As the old joke goes,
economists have predicted nine of the last three recessions.
Nevertheless, advocates of increased local autonomy should be
thinking critically about the ways in which these constraints will shape
the urban agenda in the coming decades. This Part first explores the
ways these constraints will affect both traditionally local issues and
the newer urban efforts to enforce progressive regulation. It will then
consider the ways these fiscal constraints may shape the local-state
relationship going forward.
Fiscal constraints have a direct impact on the amount of money
available to be spent on local services. As discussed in Part II, local
governments are facing both legal and practical constraints on their
ability to generate higher revenue from taxes, and they may meet
reductions in intergovernmental transfers from state and federal
sources in the coming years.121
At the same time, there will be new demands on city budgets,
including pension obligations and upgrading or replacing aging
infrastructure. Advocates of pension reform have long warned of the

117. Brandon Formby & Patrick Svitek, Going Further Than Prior Proposals,
Abbott Unveils a Plan to Slow Texas Property Tax Growth , TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 16,

2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/01/16/abbott-offers-plan-getproperty-taxes-under-control/ [https://perma.cc/RA2W-9AA2].
118. See generally City of El Cenizo, Texas v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018).
119. See Riverstone-Newell, supra note 69.
120. See, e.g., Ana Ceballos, Senate at Odds with House, Governor on Proposal
that Limits Tax Hikes, FLA. POL. (Jan. 29, 2018, 4:22 PM),
http://floridapolitics.com/archives/254807-senate-odds-house-governor-proposallimits-tax-hikes [https://perma.cc/7BMN-JTYF].
121. See supra Section II.B.

1292

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

day when pension obligations would threaten the funding of breadand-butter local services.122 Pension problems affect cities of all sizes.
For example, tiny Bisbee, Arizona (population 5312 in 2016) had the
state’s largest percentage of unfunded liability in the Pension
Retirement System, owing $10,115,918 to its retired firefighters and
$7,810,435 to its retired police officers as of January 2017.123
Meanwhile, New York City (population 8,622,698 as of July 2017124)
spent more than seventeen percent of its tax dollars on pension
obligations in 2017 and still faced a significant shortfall.125 There are
heated debates over the amount of unfunded pension liability in the
United States.126 Estimates vary because there is considerable
uncertainty about the rate of return governments can achieve on
current assets.127 Those most alarmed by the pension crisis fear that
city projects rely on unreasonably rosy rates of return and thus
unfunded liability is much greater than the amount that local
governments report.128 To close this gap, local governments must
either cut pensions (a politically difficult task) or raise revenue (also
problematic). Because pension funding does not increase currently
provided local services, it is possible local taxpayers could face rising
tax bills and shrinking service levels, which is a recipe for tax flight.
The potential for service cuts, tax increases, and the accompanying
fiscal challenges are the most talked about consequences of urban
fiscal constraints, but they are not the only consequences. Facing

122. See generally Stephen D. Eide, California Crowd-Out: How Rising
Retirement Benefit Costs Threaten Municipal Services, MANHATTAN (Apr. 16,

2015),
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these challenges requires significant investments of policy resources
and political capital address, and such efforts will necessarily compete
with other kinds of local policy experimentation. For example,
Houston’s pension reform efforts have been heralded as a national
model,129 and these reforms took months of protracted negotiations
between the public employee unions and city officials. The reform
package then required approval from the state legislature,130 and the
legislature, in turn, required the city to seek approval for its proposed
$1 billion pension bond from city voters.131 If voters had rejected the
bond, the city would have been back where it started. But even after
all that work, the city’s fiscal problems are not entirely resolved. If
the city’s pension fund has a lower rate of return than expected or a
better rate of return, that affects the city’s contributions to the
pension fund. If the contribution level must change by more than five
percent in either direction, then the city and the public sector unions
must go back to the table to renegotiate for a quicker pay down of
debt or a reduction in benefits.132 Moreover, these pension reforms do
not affect the city’s responsibility to pay for health care for its
retirees.133 Other cities facing significant pension problems may find
even more stumbling blocks to success. As a result, these cities may
either continue to drain political capital in an effort to solve the
problem or face an increasingly dire fiscal situation, and city
leadership will have less time and fewer resources to focus on other
kinds of policy leadership. It is, after all, hard to implement a new
regulatory agenda in a city facing severe fiscal problems.
At the same time, resource constraints can also fuel creative
problem-solving. It was Houston’s mayor Sylvester Turner’s frank
discussion of the prospect of municipal bankruptcy that brought the
parties to the table to negotiate pension reform.134 Already, for
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example, the cap on the SALT deduction is driving renewed interest
in municipal consolidation in New Jersey.135
More broadly, increasing fiscal problems may reinforce the
justifications for limiting local power in the first place. States
certainly have an interest in local finance distress as such distress
influences the state economy and may also affect state tax collection.
But one can imagine such arguments gaining purchase, especially in
locales where the climate is already hostile to local policy autonomy.
Of course, given states’ own struggles with pensions, there is no
reason to assume that states are better equipped to resolve these
issues than cities. To the extent that cities face increasing fiscal
problems, however, state officials are unlikely to blame themselves
and the limited authority they granted local government to raise
revenue. Rather, state officials may find it all too easy to push
through more limits on local revenue to force local governments to
spend wisely and thereby solve fiscal problems without increasing
state aid to localities.
CONCLUSION
Taken collectively, these fiscal constraints suggest that cities are
uniquely vulnerable in our federalist system, saddled with significant,
and perhaps increasing, responsibilities and limited in the revenue
sources they have to pay for them. Advocates of a prominent
regulatory role for cities must grapple with these fiscal constraints.
These constraints drain city resources, making it more difficult for
cities to pursue and expand their regulatory agenda.

135. See generally Max Cohen, Is Time Up for Tiny Towns in New Jersey? Some
Say Mergers Would Save Money and Lower Taxes, but Skeptics Disagree , PHILA.
INQUIRER
(July
3,
2018),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/new_jersey/consolidation-new-jersey-small-towntaxes-municipal-mergers-20180703.html
[https://perma.cc/B9DR-5JSA];
Chad
Goerner, Opinion, I Was the Last Mayor of Princeton Township: Consolidation
Works and We Need to Stop Being Afraid of It, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (July 8,
2018),
https://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2018/07/i_was_the_last_mayor_of_princeton_to
wnship_consoli.html [https://perma.cc/6ZQS-Q2BQ] (discussing the benefits of
municipal consolidation in New Jersey).

